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CORPORATE POLITICAL SPEECH AND THE BALANCE OF 
POWERS: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
JURISPRUDENCE IN WISCONSIN RIGHT TO LIFE 
FRANCES R. HILL* 
Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC (WRTL II) is an agenda-setting, 
framework-defining case that can be only partially understood by focusing on 
the specific issue before the Court.1  Wisconsin Right to Life’s (WRTL) as-
applied challenge to the electioneering communication provision of the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) § 2032 provided the Court’s 
new majority an opportunity to consolidate as a majority position the political 
speech framework for campaign finance jurisprudence that its long-serving 
members had previously articulated in their dissents.3  This political speech 
framework serves as the foundation for an agenda centered on expanding the 
political speech rights of corporate entities.  Taken together, the political 
speech framework and the corporate political speech agenda could well result 
in overturning most elements of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA)4 
and the case law interpreting it. 
Chief Justice Roberts captured the core of this framework in his assertion 
that “[t]hese cases are about political speech.”5  Consistent with this political 
speech framework, the Court’s new majority viewed campaign finance as a 
 
* Frances R. Hill is a Professor of Law and Director of the Graduate Program in Taxation at the 
University of Miami School of Law, where she teaches courses in tax, structural constitutional 
law, and election law.  She earned her J.D. at the Yale Law School and her Ph.D. in comparative 
politics and political theory at Harvard University. 
 1. The Supreme Court heard issues in this case twice.  In the first case, Wisconsin Right To 
Life v. FEC (WRTL I), 546 U.S. 410 (2006), the Court held that as-applied challenges to the 
electioneering communication provision were permissible.  In the second case, FEC v. Wisconsin 
Right To Life (WRTL II), 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007), the Court upheld WRTL’s as-applied challenge.  
I filed a pro bono amicus brief in support of the government’s position in WRTL I.  Brief of 
Professor Frances R. Hill, University of Miami School of Law as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Appellee, Wis. Right To Life v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 546 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-1581). 
 2. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–155, § 203, 116 Stat. 91 
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2006)). 
 3. The dissents of Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice Kennedy in the major 
campaign finance cases are discussed throughout this article. 
 4. Federal Election Campaign Act , 2 U.S.C. § 431–57. 
 5. WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2673. 
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First Amendment issue.  The majority held that BCRA § 203 burdened the 
speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.  Throughout his opinion,6 
Chief Justice Roberts described BCRA § 203, which deals with how 
electioneering communications are financed, as a “ban” on speech or a 
“prohibition” on political speech.7 
The new majority’s political speech framework is linked to a corporate 
political speech agenda dedicated to enlarging the right of corporate entities to 
use their general treasury funds for political speech.  Permitting WRTL to use 
its general treasury funds to finance three electioneering communications is an 
initial step toward this end, but it is by no means the final step.  The anticipated 
end point is the elimination of distinctions among types of political speech and 
types of political speakers. 
The transformative force of WRTL II is obscured by the division within the 
new majority over timing and tactics.  Justice Scalia, joined by Justices 
Thomas and Kennedy, would have declared the electioneering communication 
provision facially unconstitutional and would have overruled the part of 
McConnell v. FEC8 upholding it.9  The language of this concurrence is at times 
acerbic, with very pointed critiques of Chief Justice Roberts’ approach and 
reasoning.  At times the opinion bespeaks a kind of weary resignation with 
what it calls the “faux judicial restraint” of the principal opinion.10 
If, however, one looks past the rhetorical flourishes, the critical fact 
remains that five Justices agreed on the holding as well as on the political 
speech framework and the corporate political speech agenda.  Indeed, the 
holding, the framework, and the agenda have not been created by Chief Justice 
Roberts but developed over time in the dissenting opinions of Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, and Kennedy.  There is a new majority on campaign finance, and all 
five members of this new majority agree that the framework set forth in 
McConnell should be replaced.11 
 
 6. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the principal opinion in this case.  Parts I and II were joined 
by Justices, Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy and will be referred to as the majority opinion.  
Parts III and IV were joined by Justice Alito and will be referred to as the principal opinion. 
 7. Chief Justice Roberts framed the issue as follows: “The only question, then, is whether it 
is consistent with the First Amendment for BCRA § 203 to prohibit WRTL from running these 
three ads.”  Id. at 2663 (principal opinion). 
 8. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 9. WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2684–87 (Scalia, J., concurring).  In his brief concurring opinion, 
Justice Alito served notice that he would reconsider a facial challenge to McConnell if the as-
applied standard in the principal opinion “impermissibly chills political speech.”  Id. at 2674 
(Alito, J., concurring). 
 10. Id. at 2683–84, n.7. 
 11. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 114–242.  See also WRTL II, 127 S.Ct. at 2687, 2701 
(Souter, J. dissenting, joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer). 
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The majority in McConnell had based its holding on a very different 
framework supporting a very different agenda.  The McConnell majority set 
forth a democratic integrity framework and a public participation agenda 
which addressed the threat arising from corruption and the appearance of 
corruption.12  The corruption took the form of campaign contributions and 
expenditures made more to gain preferential access to the policy process than 
to express a point of view.13  The majority opinion began with a history of 
reform initiatives and the efforts that had been made to circumvent these 
reforms and stated repeatedly that Congress had ample authority to legislate in 
this area to curtail abuses and thereby protect the integrity of the democratic 
system.14  McConnell expressed the view that reform would be an ongoing 
process because the search for preferential access would continue.15  In WRTL 
II this democratic integrity framework appears in the dissent written by Justice 
Souter joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. 16 
WRTL II rejected not only the democratic integrity framework and the 
public participation, but it also rejected the McConnell Court’s determination 
that Congress properly plays a central role in campaign finance reform.17  The 
McConnell dissents argued passionately that the Court, and only the Court, 
could protect the First Amendment.18  If anything, Justice Scalia’s opinion in 
WRTL II represents an even sharper attack on Congress and its actions.  Chief 
Justice Roberts’ opinion links this balance of powers dispute to an argument 
for limited government by seeking to restrict the role of courts in campaign 
finance cases.  To Chief Justice Roberts, litigation involving prolonged 
discovery can itself burden First Amendment rights and no branch of 
government should burden political speech.19  The new majority seeks not only 
to overturn past legislative actions but also to interdict any future legislative 
initiatives not consistent with the political speech framework and the corporate 
political speech agenda.  In rejecting the circumvention rationale and the 
concept of continuing reform, Chief Justice Roberts announced, “[e]nough is 
enough.”20 
 
 12. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205. 
 13. See id. at 352 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 14. See id. at 115–122. 
 15. Id. at 224 (“[w]e are under no illusion that BCRA will be the last congressional 
statement on the matter”). 
 16. WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2687 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 17. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 187.  See infra Part V. 
 18. Id. at 340–341 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing Congress could not be trusted with the 
First Amendment).  See also id. at 264–86 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (providing a preliminary 
statement of many of the arguments which subsequently appeared in Justice Robert’s opinion in 
WRTL II). 
 19. WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2666 (principal opinion). 
 20. Id. at 2672. 
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Part I of this article analyzes the political speech framework and the 
corporate political speech agenda.  Part II discusses the decision in WRTL II.  It 
focuses on Chief Justice Roberts’ approach and his rejection of the far more 
limited, minimalist grounds put forward in WRTL’s pleadings.  Part III 
considers the implications of the decision for the larger political speech 
agenda.  Part IV considers the implications of the decision for implementing 
the corporate political speech agenda.  Part V analyzes the limited government 
and balance of power assertions made under the political speech framework 
and shows how these relate to the corporate political speech agenda.  This 
article concludes with some thoughts on the possible course of the contest 
between the two frameworks for campaign finance jurisprudence. 
I.  DEFINING THE FRAMEWORK AND SETTING THE AGENDA 
The Court has been searching for a jurisprudential framework for election 
law cases since it entered the political thicket in Baker v. Carr.21  Election law 
cases, including the campaign finance cases, have featured long discussions of 
the values of a democratic society on which the opinion was or, in a particular 
Justice’s view, should be grounded.  These discussions are generally not 
compelled by or even closely related to the facts of the case.  They read more 
like essays in political theory than like judicial opinions.22 
This is not a misplaced effort.  Frameworks matter.  A framework shapes 
the Court’s determinations in particular cases, provides guidance to lower 
federal courts in more encompassing terms than a decision in a particular case, 
and serves notice to Congress and the Federal Election Commission regarding 
the Court’s views on issues that each is likely to consider.23  A framework 
defines an organizing principle, characterizes an activity, identifies an issue, 
formulates a constitutional claim, and links the constitutional claim to a 
democratic value.  This is particularly important in the case of campaign 
finance jurisprudence because the Constitution does not address this issue 
expressly or allocate it to any of the three branches of government or even 
address the question of whether this is an issue that any government may 
regulate.  Frameworks for campaign finance jurisprudence thus address 
fundamental shortcomings in the constitutional scheme. 
Two frameworks now co-exist in considerable tension in campaign finance 
jurisprudence, and each of these frameworks is consolidated and entrenched in 
the majority opinion of a significant case.  The democratic integrity framework 
 
 21. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 187–88 (1962). 
 22. The most recent of these exercises in an election law case other than a campaign finance 
case is found in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 23. For example, the FEC relied on the principal opinion, not just the majority opinion, in 
crafting its new regulations on electioneering communications.  Notice 2007-26, 72 Fed. Reg. 
72899 (Dec. 26, 2007), codified at 11C.F.R. 104. 
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is consolidated in the majority opinion in McConnell24 and its reiteration in the 
WRTL II dissent25 represents an effort to entrench that framework in the face of 
a changing majority on the Court.  The political speech framework was 
consolidated in the dissents in McConnell26 and effectively entrenched in the 
Roberts opinion and the concurrence in WRTL II.27  The process of framework 
consolidation and entrenchment does not mean that there are no commonalities 
between the frameworks even when, as now, the Court is quite markedly 
divided.  The campaign finance frameworks share a commitment to democratic 
values despite their sharp differences over what priority should be accorded to 
these various values.28 
As frameworks consolidate, they become more closely allied with agendas 
for deciding future cases.  Opinions may well be written with an eye to the 
larger agenda and not just the case before the Court.  This does not necessarily 
result in coherence.29  Cases are decided and opinions written to entrench the 
framework and advance the agenda. 
The new majority’s political speech framework for campaign finance 
jurisprudence is linked to a corporate political speech agenda.30  The overall 
objective of the corporate political speech agenda is to eliminate current 
limitations on the use of general treasury funds to finance political speech.  
Realizing this objective involves two elements.  The first is to eliminate 
distinctions among types of political speech, and the second is to eliminate 
distinctions among political speakers.31  Achieving these objectives and 
implementing the corporate political speech agenda will result in overturning 
the central elements of federal election law.  This corporate political speech 
agenda is as ambitious as the political speech framework is transformative. 
A. Defining the Political Speech Framework 
Seen in this light, a framework may be quite far ranging, especially in its 
formative stages.  One might suggest that McConnell marked the consolidation 
and crystallization of the frameworks of both sides in the campaign finance 
 
 24. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. at 114–224. 
 25. WRTL II, 127 S.Ct. at 2687–2705 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 26. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 247–64 (Scalia, J., dissenting); 540 U.S. at 264–86 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting); 540 U.S. at 286–350 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); 540 U.S. at 350–53 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 27. WRTL II, 127 S.Ct. at 2674–87 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 28. See infra Part IV. 
 29. Richard L. Hasen, Buckley Is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance 
Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV.31, 32 (2004); 
Richard L. Hasen, The Newer Incoherence: Competition, Social Science, and Balancing in 
Campaign Finance Law after Randall v. Sorrell, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 849, 850–51 (2007). 
 30. See infra Part I.B. and Part IV. 
 31. See infra Part I.B. and Part IV. 
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doctrinal dispute, and that this consolidation of both positions has made 
compromise far more difficult in particular cases because both sides see that 
not only a limited number of issues are at stake but also, and more importantly, 
the framework  is as well. 
While frameworks are broad ranging, they can be described and compared 
in terms of certain core elements. Identifying these core elements is best 
understood as a heuristic that promotes understanding rather than providing a 
full description or capturing every nuance in the jurisprudence.32  A heuristic in 
this sense is akin to a model, or identification of elements, that is not a 
complete theory, or a set of propositions about the necessary relationships 
among various forms of the core elements.  Viewed as a heuristic, the elements 
through which a campaign finance framework can be described are an 
organizing principle, an activity, an issue, a constitutional claim, and one or 
more democratic values. 
The organizing principle in WRTL II is political speech,33 while the 
organizing principle in McConnell is democratic integrity.34  These two 
organizing principles identify the activities at issue in WRTL II differently.  
The political speech framework defines the activity as political speech and the 
issue as burdening, banning or prohibiting political speech.35  The democratic 
integrity framework identifies the activity as financing political speech and the 
issue as enhancing public participation and government responsiveness by 
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.36  The democratic 
speech framework focuses on banning political speech as a threat to liberty, 
while the political integrity framework focuses on the threat of corruption or 
 
 32. For broad-ranging discussion, see GERD GIGERENZER & CHRISTOPH ENGLE (EDS.), 
HEURISTICS AND THE LAW (2004). 
 33. WRTL II, 127 S.Ct. at 2673 (“these cases are about political speech”) (Roberts, C.J., 
principal opinion). 
 34. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 115–32 traces the history of efforts to limit the influence of large 
contributions made to replace the public interest with special interests.  In WRTL II, 127 S.Ct. at 
2689, the dissent noted disapprovingly “the demand for campaign money in huge amounts from 
large contributors, whose power has produced a cynical electorate” and noted approvingly “the 
congressional recognition of the ensuing threat to democratic integrity as reflected in a century of 
legislation restriction the electoral leverage of concentrations of money in corporate and union 
treasuries.” (Souter, J. dissenting). 
 35. Chief Justice Roberts refers repeatedly to “banning” or “prohibiting” or “censoring” 
speech by disallowing the use of general treasury funds for campaign speech.  WRTL II, 127 S.Ct. 
at 2663–64, 2673 (Roberts, C.J.) (principal opinion). 
 36. The new majority in McConnell, 540 U.S. at 115 cites Elihu Root, who concluded that 
large political contributions made for the purpose of advancing special interests at odds with the 
public interest were “a growing evil which has done more to shake the confidence of the plain 
people of small means of this country in our political institutions than any other practice which 
has ever obtained since the foundation of our Government.” (citing E. ROOT, ADDRESSES ON 
GOVERNMENT AND CITIZEN SHIP 143 (1916). 
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the appearance of corruption as a threat to meaningful participation and 
representation.37  The political speech framework locates the issue in the First 
Amendment and reads the language of the First Amendment as very close to an 
absolute limitation on the authority of Congress to burden speech.38  The 
democratic integrity framework locates the issue not only in the First 
Amendment but also in Article I, defining the powers of Congress, the first 
sentence of the Constitution, which identifies the people as the source of 
sovereign authority, and, far more broadly, in the system of checks and 
balances designed to prevent aggregation of power.39  These differences are 
apparent in the two cases identified in this article with the competing campaign 
finance frameworks and agendas. 
In broad outline, the McConnell framework was grounded on a relationship 
between elections and the public policy process and the conviction that 
campaign finance laws were integral to the integrity of both.40  The political 
integrity framework treats politicians and those seeking to buy undue influence 
in the policy process as the target of campaign finance laws.41  The goal of the 
law in this area was to ensure opportunities for participation by ordinary 
individuals, including the right of individuals to form organizations to amplify 
their voices in public policy debates and in election campaigns.42 The majority 
opinion interpreted the history of campaign finance law as a series of efforts to 
interdict use of financial power to gain favored access to and disproportionate 
influence over public policy processes.43  Justice Souter concluded that 
“political integrity” has a “value second to none in a free society.”44  The 
majority in McConnell took the position that the Court should defer to 
reasoned congressional action and found that Congress could take account of 
 
 37. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 115, 122–32. 
 38. WRTL II, 127 S.Ct. at 2674 (Roberts, C.J.) (principal opinion). 
 39. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 115–32, 223–24 (Stevens, J. and O’Connor, J.); see also WRTL 
II, 127 S.Ct. at 2705 (noting “the understanding of the voters and Congress that this kind of 
corporate and union spending serious jeopardizes the integrity of democratic government”) 
(Souter, J. dissenting). 
 40. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 115–32 (effects of political contributions on access and 
representation). 
 41. Id. at 122–32. 
 42. Id. at 122 (noting that this case is about organizations, while Buckley dealt with 
individuals). 
 43. Id. at 120–21. 
 44. FEC v. Wis. Right To Life, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 2689 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(“Devoting concentrations of money in self-interested hands to the support of political 
campaigning therefore threatens the capacity of this democracy to represent its constituents and 
the confidence of its citizens in their capacity to govern themselves.  These are the elements 
summed up in the notion of political integrity, giving it a value second to none in a free 
society.”). 
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actual practices and abuses in campaign finance.45  In his dissent in WRTL II, 
Justice Souter identified as the core issue, politicians’ “demand for campaign 
money in huge amounts from large contributors” and then called attention to 
“the congressional recognition of the ensuing threat to democratic integrity as 
reflected in a century of legislation restricting the electoral leverage of 
concentrations of money in corporate and union treasuries.”46  Justice Souter’s 
dissent in WRTL II is an argument for the continued validity of the McConnell 
framework despite his conclusion that McConnell “is effectively, and 
unjustifiably, overruled today.”47 
The new majority’s framework in WRTL II is based on political speech as 
the organizing principal.  Chief Justice Roberts states “[t]hese cases are about 
political speech”48 and concludes that in cases dealing with political speech 
“we give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not censorship.”49  Chief Justice 
Roberts grounds his conclusions in the language of the First Amendment.50  He 
remarks toward the end of his opinion: 
Yet as is often the case in this Court’s First Amendment opinions, we have 
gotten this far in the analysis without quoting the Amendment itself: ‘Congress 
shall make no law. . .abridging the freedom of speech.  The Framers’ actual 
words put these cases in proper perspective.  Our jurisprudence over the past 
216 years had rejected an absolutist interpretation of those words, but when it 
comes to drawing difficult lines in the area of pure political speech—between 
what is protected and what the Government may ban—it is worth recalling the 
language we are applying.51 
The democratic value underlying the political speech framework is liberty, 
which is seen as the core protection for democracy.  The political speech 
framework treats all speakers as the targets of campaign finance laws.  While 
these laws may be directed at large donors and the politicians who demand 
them as the price of preferred access to the policy process, liberty values 
require that the size of the contribution or expenditure not become a basis for 
limiting liberty.52 
 
 45. See generally McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2007). 
 46. WRTL II, 127 S.Ct. at 2687 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 2673 (principal opinion). 
 49. Id. at 2674. 
 50. WRTL II, 127 S.Ct. at 2672–74 (Roberts, C.J.) (principal opinion); see Lillian R. BeVier, 
First Amendment Basics Redux: Buckley v. Valeo to FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, CATO 
SUPREME COURT REVIEW 77, 79 (2007) (“It is Buckley’s First Amendment foundations that are 
of interest here, not the rickety doctrinal house the Court built upon them.  WRTL II returned to 
and rebuilt those foundations, and that is what matters most about it.”). 
 51. WRTL II, 127 S.Ct. at 2674 (Roberts, C.J.) (principal opinion). 
 52. Id. at 2672.  
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Liberty is inconsistent with distinctions among types of speech or types of 
speakers.53  Such distinctions among types of speech or types of speakers find 
no basis in the words of the First Amendment.  The intent of any speaker or the 
consequences of any speech are not considered.54  There is no compelling state 
interest sufficient to limit political speech or to require that political speech 
rights be balanced against other rights.55  Speech rights eclipse the remainder 
of the Constitution in campaign finance jurisprudence.56 
Chief Justice Roberts’ political speech framework provides a foundation 
for rejecting the core elements of the McConnell framework.  Corruption is not 
a compelling state interest.57  It is either a criminal law matter or an 
impermissible rationale for limiting liberty.  The appearance of corruption is 
not a compelling state interest but an impermissible burden on political speech 
rights.58  Circumvention is not an issue because political speech rights are not 
subject to any meaningful limits that could be circumvented.59  These are areas 
that no government can regulate.  Chief Justice Roberts and the other members 
of the new majority want to limit the role of Congress in this area and to 
allocate the predominant role in this area to the courts.60 
The two frameworks for campaign finance jurisprudence have now been 
consolidated as majority positions in separate cases.  Part of the consolidation 
and entrenchment of frameworks is their link to particular agendas.  The 
McConnell majority anticipated future reforms in campaign finance law.61  The 
 
 53. As is discussed more fully below, the new majority seeks to remove barriers to political 
speech by corporate speakers, which it equates with removing barriers to the use of general 
treasury funds to finance such corporate political speech.  See infra PartI.B. and Part IV. 
 54. WRTL II, 127 S.Ct. at 2665–70 (rejecting intent or effects tests).  Although this analysis 
appears in the principal opinion which was joined only by Justice Alito, it has become the basis 
for FEC regulations.  See FEC Notice 2007-27, 72 Fed. Reg. 72899 (December 26, 2007). 
 55. Id. at 2664, 2671–73 (rejecting both corruption and the effect of aggregated wealth as 
compelling state interest supporting regulation of speech is not express advocacy.). 
 56. The primacy and, indeed, the exclusivity of reliance on the First Amendment became 
clear in McConnell, where the dissents each began with a pointed reference to the First 
Amendment.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 248 (Scalia, J., dissenting); 264 (Thomas, J. dissenting); 
286 (Kennedy, J. dissenting). 
 57. WRTL II, 127.S.Ct. at 2672. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See infra Part V. 
 61. McConnell, 540 U.S. 223–24.  
Many years ago we observed that ‘[t]o say that Congress is without power to pass 
appropriate legislation to safeguard . . . an election from the improper use of money to 
influence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power of self 
protection.’  Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. at 545.  We abide by that conviction in 
considering Congress’ most recent effort to confine the ill effects of aggregated wealth on 
our political system.  We are under no illusion that the BCRA will be the last 
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WRTL II majority anticipates curtailing the effects of McConnell and its 
predecessors and even overturning substantial elements of FECA.62 
B. Setting the Agenda: Political Speech by Corporate Speakers 
The political speech framework is linked to a corporate political speech 
agenda with two interrelated objectives.  One is to eliminate distinctions 
among types of political speech.  The other is to eliminate distinctions among 
speakers who engage in political speech.  If fully implemented in its most 
comprehensive form, the corporate speech agenda would result in the 
determination that most elements of FECA are impermissible burdens on First 
Amendment rights of political speech.  All five members of the WRTL II 
majority agree on this agenda but not on how quickly or directly to implement 
it.63  Understanding how such a broad result might follow from what appears 
initially to be a narrow issue in WRTL II requires consideration of the web of 
interrelated provisions in FECA. 
II.  DECIDING THE CASE 
WRTL’s as-applied challenge to BCRA § 203 served the Court’s agenda-
setting, framework defining purposes, but its specific claims in support of its 
position did not.64  WRTL’s claims represented an incremental approach that 
would have left much of the McConnell framework intact.  A 5-4 majority of 
the Roberts Court had no interest in any opinion that would have maintained, 
even as an interim step, the McConnell framework.  For reasons best known to 
himself, Chief Justice Roberts chose to write an opinion creating an impression 
of minimalism.  At the same time, the spirited concurrence written by Justice 
Scalia and joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Kennedy, reinforced a broader 
interpretation calling much of federal election law into question, especially 
when read in the context of their dissents in McConnell.  This broader 
interpretation is not inconsistent with Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion. 
A. WRTL’s Claims and Reasoning 
WRTL is a nonprofit corporation organized under Wisconsin law.  It is 
exempt from federal income tax as an entity described in section 501(c)(4) of 
 
congressional statement on the matter. . . .  What problems will arise, and how congress 
will respond, are concerns for another day. 
Id. 
 62. WRTL II, 127 S.Ct. at 2672 (rejecting a circumvention analysis as a “prophylaxis-upon-
prophylaxis approach” and concluding that “enough is enough”) (Roberts, C.J., principal 
opinion). 
 63. See infra Part IV. 
 64. See infra Part II.B for WRTL’s claims.  See infra Part II.C for an analysis of Chief 
Justice Roberts’ response to WRTL’s claims. 
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the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).65  The section 501(c)(4) entity is a 
component of a complex structure of related tax exempt entities including a 
section 501(c)(3) public charity, which is eligible to receive tax deductible 
contributions under section 170 of the IRC, and a Political Action Committee 
(PAC), which is a political committee for purposes of federal election law and 
is exempt from federal income tax under section 527 of the IRC.66 
This case arose when WRTL claimed that it was prohibited from running 
broadcast ads addressing the issue of filibusters in the United States Senate67 
due to the electioneering communications provisions of BCRA § 203.68  
WRTL freely admitted that its ads fell within the definition of an 
electioneering communication because they would be funded by a corporate 
entity69 using its general treasury funds,70 they were targeted to the relevant 
electorate,71 they would be aired during the statutory period prior to a federal 
election72 and they mentioned the name of a candidate for federal office.73  
 
 65. WRTL II, 127 S.Ct. at 2660. 
 66. For a detailed analysis of the various types of tax exempt entities, see FRANCES R. HILL 
& DOUGLAS M. MANCINO, TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (2002 with semi-annual 
supplements). 
 67. WRTL II, 127 S.Ct. at 2660, 2660-61 n.2, 2661 n.3 (quoting text of each of the ads). 
 68. Wis. Right to Life v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410, 410 (2006). 
 69. WRTL is a corporation organized under Wisconsin law.  FECA § 441b(a) extends the 
prohibition on using general treasury funds for contributions or expenditures to “any corporation 
whatever, or any labor organization.”  2 U.S.C. § 441b(a).  This prohibition is made applicable to 
financing of electioneering communications by 2 U.S.C. § 441b(c)(1), which prohibits funding by 
“any entity described in subsection (a) of this section.”  For federal income tax purposes, WRTL 
may engage in unlimited legislative lobbying without jeopardizing its tax exempt status.  See 
HILL & MANCINO, supra note 66, at ¶ 13.03. 
 70. WRTL may, consistent with its exempt status under section 501(c)(4) accept 
contributions from any person, individual or corporate, domestic or foreign and may use these 
funds solely for legislative lobbying if it so chooses.  See HILL & MANCINO, supra note 67, at ¶ 
13.03; see also Frances R. Hill, Softer Money: Exempt Organizations and Campaign Finance, 91 
TAX NOTES 477 (April 16, 2001). 
 71. The ads were targeted to Wisconsin voters.  Targeting is defined in BCRA § 201(c), 
which is codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(C).  WRTL II, 127 S.Ct. at 2663 (principal opinion) 
(finding the ads were or would have been targeted). 
 72. WRTL stated that “[d]uring the summer of 2004, the filibustering of nominees to the 
federal bench reached its peak and WRTL launched a grass-roots lobbying campaign to 
encourage its two United States Senators to oppose filibusters in upcoming votes.”  Jurisdictional 
Statement of Appellant at 4, Wis. Right to Life v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410 (2005).  WRTL aired only 
one of its ads and did not run the others to avoid the penalties under BCRA.  WRTL II, 127 S.Ct. 
at 2660-61.  The statutory period is defined as thirty days before a primary election and sixty days 
before a general election.  BCRA § 201(a), codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(a)(i)(III). 
 73. An electioneering communication “refers to a clearly identified candidate for federal 
office.  BCRA § 201(a), codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i)(I).  The ads mentioned the name of 
Senator Feingold, who was a candidate in the Democratic Party primary, and the name of Senator 
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WRTL claimed that the electioneering communication provision of federal 
election law was unconstitutional as applied to the three ads it wished to 
finance using its general treasury funds.74 
WRTL based its claim on its characterization of the three ads as grassroots 
lobbying and limited its as-applied challenge to communications that could be 
so characterized.  It then claimed that BCRA § 203 violated its First 
Amendment rights of expression, association, and petition when applied to 
grassroots lobbying ads because “[a]uthentic grass-roots lobbying is inherent in 
our constitutional system of representative government and is so essential to 
the people’s self government that it requires an exception.”75 
While it acknowledged that it could have funded its broadcast ads from its 
general treasury if it had not been organized in corporate form, WRTL rejected 
any idea of operating in a non-corporate form, reasoning: 
The most effective means of gathering, analyzing, and disseminating the 
necessary legislative information is through citizen watchdog groups created 
by the people.  The most effective form for these groups is the nonprofit 
corporate form, not to amass business income, which nonprofits do not do, but 
to facilitate capable leadership by protecting directors and officers from 
individual liability for acts of the group.  Conditioning one’s right to do 
grassroots lobbying on not incorporating imposes a significant obstacle to the 
group’s speech, association and petition activities.76 
WRTL also acknowledged that it could have funded its broadcast ads by 
using its controlled PAC, the WRTL–PAC,77 but rejected this alternative as 
well.  WRTL described the PAC option as “a serious burden” that is 
“inadequate, constitutionally and factually” as a means of funding grassroots 
lobbying communications.78  WRTL asserted that it did not have enough 
 
Kohl, who was not a candidate.  Each of the ads urged Wisconsin voters to “contact Senator 
Feingold and Senator Kohl.”  Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant, supra note 72, at 13a-17a. 
 74. Jurisdictional Statement for Appellant, supra note 72 at i.  WRTL also claimed that the 
electioneering communications provision was unconstitutional as applied to “grass-roots lobbying 
communications generally, as carefully defined.”  Id.  With respect to its facial challenge, WRTL 
urged that “[t]his Court should go beyond the three broadcast ads, derive the constitutional 
principle, and state a bright-line rule recognizing an exception to the prohibition on corporate 
electioneering communication for authentic grass-roots lobbying.”  Id. at 25. 
 75. Id at 24. (emphasis in original). 
 76. Brief for Appellee at 44-45, FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (2006) (Nos. 06-
969 & 06-970) (internal citations omitted).  See also Brief for Appellant at 43, Wis. Right To Life 
v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410 (2005) (No. 04-1581). 
 77. WRTL is a component of a complex structure of related tax exempt entities including a 
section 501(c)(3) public charity that engages in campaign activity and a PAC, which is exempt 
from federal income tax under section 527.  Brief of Professor Frances R. Hill, supra note 1, at 5–
6. 
 78. Brief for Appellee, supra note 76, at 33. 
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money in its PAC to run the ads at issue79 and that it needed the money it did 
have in the PAC to fund independent expenditures and contributions to 
candidates.80 WRTL also claimed that the PAC option imposed 
constitutionally impermissible burdens on fundraising for grassroots 
lobbying.81  WRTL complained specifically about the requirement that it raise 
PAC funds only from WRTL members,82 about the restrictions on the 
definition of a member,83 and about the annual limitation on contributions to a 
PAC.84  In light of these concerns, WRTL argued that “[t]he PAC alternative in 
such situations is effectively a complete ban.”85 
WRTL further acknowledged that it would not have been subject to the 
electioneering communication provision if it had accepted contributions only 
from individual contributors.86  WRTL did not develop arguments relating to 
the burdens this would place on its fundraising, but it agreed that it was not a 
“qualified nonprofit corporation” because it accepted contributions from 
corporations as well as from individuals.87 
To the extent that WRTL made claims based on its corporate form, these 
claims played a role in Chief Justice Roberts’ reasoning.  WRTL’s assertion of 
a First Amendment right to operate in corporate form and its claim that being 
required to fund electioneering communications by using its controlled PAC 
imposed an impermissible burden on its First Amendment rights were 
consistent with the majority’s agenda-setting objectives.  To the extent that 
WRTL made corporate claims dependent on its nonprofit tax exempt status, 
Chief Justice Roberts ignored the special characteristics and treated them as 
general corporate claims.88  These claims were inconsistent with the larger 
 
 79. Id. at 9 n.17 (claiming that the ads would have cost $100,000 but that the PAC has only 
$14,000).  See also Brief for Appellant, supra note 76, at 5–6. 
 80. Brief for Appellee, supra note 76, at 9 n.17 (citing 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(8) and (17) (2007).  
(“If these funds were used for the grassroots lobbying ads, they would not have been available for 
the contributions and independent expenditures that WRTL-PAC intended to make”)) 
 81. Brief for Appellee, supra note 76, at 33–34. 
 82. Brief for Appellant, supra note 76, at 41 (complaining about the time-consuming process 
of raising money from FECA-compliant “members”); Id. at 41 n.29 (discusses the regulations 
applicable to PACs controlled by “membership corporations” like WRTL); 11 C.F.R. § 
114.1(e)(1) (2007). 
 83. Brief for Appellant, supra note 76, at 41. 
 84. Id. at 32. 
 85. Id. at 42. 
 86. If WRTL had accepted contributions only from individuals, it would have qualified as 
the kind of I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) advocacy organization described in FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 
479 U.S. 238 (1986) and would have been treated as a “qualified nonprofit corporation” for 
federal election law purposes consistent with 11 C.F.R. 114.10.  For a more detailed discussion of 
the concept of a “qualified nonprofit corporation” in federal election law, see infra Part II.C. 
 87. Brief for Appellant, supra note 76, at 31. 
 88. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2671–73 (2007) (principal opinion). 
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agenda and thus were not relied upon to decide the case before the Court.  To 
the extent, however, that WRTL advanced claims based on characterizing its 
ads as a particular type of speech, as “grassroots lobbying,” the Chief Justice 
completely ignored these claims because they were inconsistent with the 
corporate political speech agenda.  This meant that little of WRTL’s reasoning 
appeared in either Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion or in Justice Scalia’s opinion 
or, indeed, in Justice Souter’s dissent.89  None of the Justices expressed any 
interest in crafting a test for characterizing speech as legislative lobbying.  The 
majority was interested only in removing barriers under existing statutes and 
judicial precedents to political speech by corporate speakers. 
B. Chief Justice Roberts’ Opinion 
For purposes of setting the larger agenda and consolidating the framework, 
the most important fact in the case was WRTL’s organization as a corporate 
entity and its most important claim was that it had a First Amendment right to 
fund electioneering communications with its general treasury funds rather than 
with funds from its controlled PAC. 
The Court decided that BCRA § 203 is unconstitutional as applied to the 
WRTL ads before the Court.90  The majority opinion raised two questions.  
The first was whether the ads involved issue advocacy or the functional 
equivalent of speech that expressly advocated the election or defeat of a 
candidate for federal office.91  The second was whether the state interests that 
justify regulating express advocacy extend to speech that is not express 
advocacy or its functional equivalent.92  It answered these questions as follows: 
We conclude that the speech at issue in this as-applied challenge is not the 
“functional equivalent” of express campaign speech.  We further conclude that 
the interests held to justify restricting corporate campaign speech or its 
functional equivalent do not justify restricting issue advocacy, and accordingly 
we hold that BCRA § 203 is unconstitutional as applied to the advertisements 
at issue in these cases.93 
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion explaining these holdings is divided into four 
parts.  The first recited the history of the case,94 the second found that the 
 
 89. The Court is not bound to decide cases based on the arguments advanced in the briefs in 
the case.  However, it is ironic to find that in the same term Chief Justice Roberts, in his dissent in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1466 (2007), observed that “it is ironic that the Court 
today adopts a new theory of Article III standing for States without the benefit of briefing or 
argument on the point.” 
 90. WRTL II, 127 S.Ct. at 2659. 
 91. Id.  (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 206 (2003) (referring to “the functional 
equivalent of express advocacy”)). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 2659–62. 
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Court had jurisdiction,95 the third held that strict scrutiny was the required 
standard of review,96 and the fourth considered whether the electioneering 
communications provisions could be applied to the ads at issue because BCRA 
§ 203 was narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.97 
In determining whether the ads were the functional equivalent of express 
advocacy or whether they were issue advocacy, Chief Justice Roberts 
concluded that “a court should find that an ad is the functional equivalent of 
express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation 
other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.”98  He 
categorically rejected tests based on either intent or effects.99  He advanced 
four criteria for an appropriate test.  The first is that the test “must be objective, 
focusing on the substance of the communication rather than amorphous 
considerations of intent and effect.”100  The second criterion is a response to 
the protracted litigation and expansive record, not to mention the lower court 
opinion in McConnell, namely, that the test “must entail minimal if any 
discovery, to allow parties to resolve disputes quickly without chilling speech 
through the threat of burdensome litigation.”101  The test must not involve 
multiple factors, which will lead to complex arguments and protracted 
appeals.102  Whether Chief Justice Roberts can prune the political thicket by 
chilling access to courts and limiting the kinds of arguments that parties may 
make and that courts may hear raises balance of powers issues discussed 
below.103  The final section of Chief Justice Roberts’ principal opinion 
addresses the question of whether BCRA § 203 is narrowly tailored to further a 
compelling state interest.104  Chief Justice Roberts considered and rejected two 
governmental interests that have been applied to various types of campaign 
 
 95. Id. at 2662–63. 
 96. WRTL II, 127 S.Ct. at 2663–64 (principal opinion). 
 97. Id. at 2664–66. 
 98. Id. at 2667. 
 99. Id. at 2665 
 100. Id. at 2666. 
 101. Id.  It is far from clear that the Supreme Court can constrain the right—or the duty—of a 
lower federal court, which is a trier of facts, to determine those facts even if discovery is required 
in this effort.  What the Supreme Court may do is to declare that facts are irrelevant under the 
only permissible constitutional test.  This approach would be more coherent in a determination 
that BCRA § 203 is facially unconstitutional than in an as-applied challenge.  This factor is one of 
the reasons that at least seven of the Justices agree that Chief Justice Roberts has held that BCRA 
§ 203 is facially unconstitutional. 
 102. WRTL II, 127 S.Ct. at 2666–67 (principal opinion) (rejecting the “‘open-ended rough-
and-tumble of factors’” that invites “‘complex argument in a trial court and a virtually inevitable 
appeal’” (quoting Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock, Co., 513 U.S. 527, 547 
(1995))). 
 103. See infra Part V. 
 104. WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2671 (principal opinion). 
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speech: the interest in preventing corruption and the interest in regulating the 
effects of wealth differentials on elections.105  The Chief Justice limited the 
first, based on Buckley, and dismissed the second, based on Austin, and linked 
them more directly to the limitations imposed on corporate speech.106 
Chief Justice Roberts traced the expansion of the corruption interest 
applied in Buckley to uphold contribution limits.  He did not challenge the 
corruption interest, but he clearly regarded its expansion as impermissible.107  
He noted Buckley contemplated that the same rationale might also apply to 
independent expenditures but minimized the significance of this element of 
Buckley by observing that “this interest might also justify limits on 
electioneering expenditures because it may be that, in some circumstances, 
‘large independent expenditures pose the same dangers of actual or apparent 
quid pro quo arrangements as do large contributions.’108  Chief Justice Roberts 
also rejected McConnell’s extension of the anti-corruption rationale to ads that 
were the functional equivalent of express advocacy.109  In an aside that may 
prove particularly revealing, the Chief Justice referred to the government 
interest in preventing corruption as an interest “which this Court had only 
assumed could justify regulation of express advocacy.”110  According to Chief 
Justice Roberts, reliance on corruption as a compelling government interest in 
WRTL II means “this interest must be stretched yet another step to ads that are 
not the functional equivalent of express advocacy.”111  This is the step Chief 
Justice Roberts refused to take, declaring flatly that 
“[e]nough is enough. Issue ads like WRTL’s are by no means equivalent to 
contributions, and the quid-pro-quo corruption interest cannot justify 
regulating them.  To equate WRTL’s ads with contributions is to ignore their 
value as political speech.”112 
The Chief Justice rejected arguments based on the danger of circumvention 
of express advocacy limitations and the contribution provisions.  Noting that 
while the “[a]ppellants argue that an expansive definition of ‘functional 
equivalent’ is needed to ensure that issue advocacy does not circumvent the 
rule against express advocacy, which in turn helps protect against 
circumvention of the rule against contributions . . . such a prophylaxis-upon-
 
 105. Id. at 2672–73. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 2672 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976)). 
 108. Id. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25). 
 109. Id. (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 204–06 (2003)). 
 110. WRTL II, 127 S.Ct. at 2672 (principal opinion).  Whether the Chief Justice meant to 
signal a willingness to question the anti-corruption rationale as a compelling interest upholding 
contribution limitations at some future date remains unclear but should not be summarily 
dismissed. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
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prophylaxis approach to regulating expression is not consistent with strict 
scrutiny.”113 
The Chief Justice also found that “the corrosive and distorting effects of 
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the 
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for 
the corporation’s political ideas” did not provide a compelling government 
interest for regulating the ads in this case.114  Noting that both Austin and 
McConnell invoked this interest in support of the regulation of express 
advocacy, referred to here as “campaign speech,” the Chief Justice noted 
“[a]ccepting the notion that a ban on campaign speech could also embrace 
issue advocacy would call into question our holding in Bellotti that the 
corporate identity of a speaker does not strip corporations of all free speech 
rights.”115  He reasoned that 
[i]t would be a constitutional “bait and switch” to conclude that corporate 
campaign speech may be banned in part because corporate issue advocacy is 
not, and then assert that corporate issue advocacy may be banned as well, 
pursuant to the same asserted compelling interest, through a broad conception 
of what constitutes the functional equivalent of campaign speech or by relying 
on the inability to distinguish campaign speech from issue advocacy.116 
Chief Justice Roberts made no reference to the use of a controlled PAC to 
avoid this problem. 
This is a nuanced but not a minimal opinion. As is discussed below, Chief 
Justice Roberts had ample opportunity to write a minimal opinion within the 
McConnell framework and carefully avoided all of these opportunities.117 
Only Justice Alito joined the “principal opinion” in its entirety.118  He gave 
three reasons for doing so and one reason for writing a short concurring 
opinion.119  Justice Alito joined the principal opinion because BCRA § 203 
“cannot constitutionally ban any advertisement that may reasonably be 
interpreted as anything other than an appeal to vote for or against a 
candidate.”120  He added, “the ads at issue here “may reasonably be interpreted 
as something other than such an appeal,” and it is unnecessary to decide 
 
 113. Id.  In support of this position Chief Justice Roberts quoted Buckley's determination that 
expenditure limitations “cannot be sustained simply by invoking the interest in maximizing the 
effectiveness of the less intrusive contribution limitations.”  Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 44 (1976)). 
 114. Id. (citing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)). 
 115. Id. at 2673. 
 116. WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2673 (principal opinion).. 
 117. See infra Part II.C. 
 118. WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2674 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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whether BCRA § 203 is facially unconstitutional.121  Justice Alito also set forth 
one reason for writing a separate concurring opinion.  He served notice that he 
would find a facial challenge to BCRA § 203 appropriate “[i]f it turns out that 
the implementation of the as-applied standard set out in the principal opinion 
impermissibly chills political speech.”122 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, joined in Parts I 
and II of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion and in the result, but took issue with 
Chief Justice Roberts’ reasoning.123  Justice Scalia described the result as 
holding that applying BCRA § 203 to WRTL’s ad is not consistent with the 
First Amendment.124  He stated his difference with the principal opinion 
succinctly, concluding that he “would overrule that part of the Court’s decision 
in McConnell upholding § 203(a) of BCRA.”125  Indeed, he asserts that the 
principal opinion does find BCRA § 203 facially unconstitutional and 
expressed his annoyance that Chief Justice Roberts refused to admit what he 
has done.126  This annoyance is based on Justice Scalia’s conclusion that First 
Amendment rights cannot be protected through as-applied challenges.127  
Justice Scalia based this conclusion on his determination that “the McConnell 
regime is unworkable because of the inability of any acceptable as-applied test 
to validate the facial constitutionality of § 203—that is, its inability to sustain 
proscription of the vast majority of issue ads.”128 
Focusing on the differences among Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, 
and Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, provides one 
important perspective on what the Court decided and the implications of that 
decision.  Examining only the differences provides, at best, a very partial and 
ultimately misleading perspective on WRTL II.  It ignores at least two 
important features of the opinion.  The first is that there is a majority on the 
Court for many of the underlying propositions that define a jurisprudential 
framework for overturning McConnell and finding not just BCRA but also 
FECA unconstitutional in substantial part, and perhaps in their entirety.  
Second, there is a majority for simply ignoring certain of the central issues that 
have never been addressed directly, must less resolved, while asserting 
implicitly that these issues are settled as constitutional matters.129  This 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 2674–87 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 124. WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2676 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 125. Id. at 2687 
 126. Id. at 2683–84 n.7.  Justice Souter agrees with this assessment in his dissent.  Id. at 
2699–700 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 127. Id. at 2685 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 128. Id. 
 129. See infra Part III. 
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majority opinion is as important, and probably more important, than the 
differences among the Justices in the majority. 
In the end, the differences among the Justices are questions of timing.  
Justice Alito thinks that a facial challenge can be heard in the future.130  Justice 
Scalia would not disagree but sees no reason to delay what he regards as the 
constitutionally required outcome as set forth in his prior dissents.131 
C. Rejecting the Minimalist Alternatives 
For reasons best known to himself, Chief Justice Roberts chose not to 
overrule McConnell.  As is discussed below, Justice Scalia found this approach 
incoherent.132  While this may be correct in some respects, it does not diminish 
the force of WRTL II as an agenda-setting, framework-defining case.  The 
approach that Chief Justice Roberts took is far bolder than at least four other 
approaches, which would have produced a minimal opinion and left the 
McConnell framework substantially intact.133  The opinion he did write can be 
understood more fully in light of the opinions he chose not to write and the 
reasons for not writing them.  Each of these alternative bases for minimal 
opinions would have constrained the corporate political speech agenda and 
narrowed the political speech framework that emerges from the majority 
opinion in WRTL II. 
First, he could have followed the structure of BCRA and applied the 
backup definition of an electioneering communication.134  As Justice Scalia 
noted, Chief Justice Roberts’ test tracks the language of the backup definition, 
but the Chief Justice never mentions the backup definition.135  This is not an 
oversight and no one could believe that the Chief Justice is less than thorough.  
Two reasons seem plausible: Either the Chief Justice did not want to indicate 
in any way that BCRA has any continuing validity, or relying on the backup 
definition would not have permitted Chief Justice Roberts to focus as directly 
on the political speech framework and the corporate political speech agenda. 
 
 130. Id. at 2674 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 131. WRTL II, 127 S.Ct. at 2685–86 (Scalia, J. concurring). 
 132. See id. at 2684 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 133. See infra Part II.C. 
 134. The backup definition in BCRA § 201(a) reads as follows: 
If clause (i) is held to be constitutionally insufficient by final judicial decision to support 
the Regulations provided herein, then the term ‘electioneering communication’ means any 
broadcast Cable or satellite communication which promotes or supports a candidate for 
that office, or attacks Or opposes a candidate for that office (regardless of whether the 
communication expressly Advocates a vote for or against a specific candidate) and which 
also is suggestive of no plausible Meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against 
a specific candidate. 
BCRA § 201(a), codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(ii). 
 135. See WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2680 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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Second, he could have treated the ads in question as grassroots lobbying 
and defined an exception for grassroots ads.  WRTL made a claim that its 
electioneering communications should be characterized as grassroots 
legislative lobbying.136  WRTL recognized that its claim that the ads 
constituted grassroots lobbying required it both to provide a definition of 
grassroots lobbying and to develop a claim that this definition identified a 
category of constitutionally protected activity.137  Throughout the course of the 
litigation, WRTL set forth various formulations of such a definition and 
admitted that its definition was derived from the definition of grassroots 
lobbying in federal tax law.138  The common factor was the concept of a nexus 
with current legislative activity, not past votes or positions of candidates.139  In 
another formulation based on sixteen enumerated factors, WRTL referred to 
“particular or specific, pending legislative action as opposed to a general issue” 
 
 136. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 76, at 33–39. 
 137. See id. at 9–10, 15–19. 
 138. See id. at 20–21.  Tax law provide two distinct approaches to defining legislative 
lobbying.  First is the substantial part test of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), and the second is the expenditure 
test set forth in I.R.C. § 501(h), as defined in I.R.C. § 4911 and the regulations there under.  For a 
detailed analysis of the substantial part test and the expenditure test of the legislative lobbying, 
see HILL & MANCINO, supra note 67, at Chapter 5 and ¶ 13.03.  For the Internal Revenue 
Service’s most recent guidance on distinguishing impermissible participation or intervention in a 
political campaign from other forms of advocacy, including issue advocacy and grassroots 
lobbying, see Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421. 
 139. In its Brief in WRTL II, it defined grassroots lobbying in the following terms: 
First, based on the text of the communication, it focuses on a current legislative branch 
matter, takes a position on the matter, and urges the public to ask a legislator to take a 
particular position or action with respect to the matter in his or her official capacity.  
Second, the ad does not mention any election, candidacy, political party, or challenger, or 
the official's character, qualifications, or fitness for office.  Third, as long as the ad 
follows this pattern, the fact that the ad states the position of the candidate on the matter, 
which is objectively accurate and based on publicly available means of verification, and 
praises or criticizes the candidate for that position, does not effect [sic] it genuineness. 
Analytically, the first part makes the ad a grassroots lobbying ad and, by its “focus,” 
eliminates cognizable electoral effect.  The second part further assures a lack of such 
cognizable effect, by not mentioning anything about the election or “the official’s 
character, qualifications, or fitness for office.”  And the third part allows a forceful 
discussion of the merits of the matter, which merely say that the public official is wrong 
or right on the issue, not wrong for office. 
Brief for Appellee, supra note 76, at 56–57 (footnotes omitted).  WRTL emphasized the 
importance of the legislative nexus in a footnote explaining the concept of a current legislative 
matter for this purpose, stating that “[c]urrent requires that the ad not talk about a past issue, but 
one under current consideration.”  Id. at 56 n. 66 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 
577 (D.D.C. 2003) (Kollar-Kotelley, J.)); Id. at 918 (Leon, J.).  Comparisons of candidates’ past 
votes or campaign position have been the characteristic of voter scorecards and other forms of 
candidate ranking that are generally treated as impermissible participation and intervention in a 
political campaign for federal tax purposes. 
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and to the organization’s “clear and long-held interest” in the issue.140  WRTL 
described the focus of its own ads as “imminently pending, specific legislative 
activity while Congress was in session, the timing of which was beyond the 
control of WRTL.”141  It distinguished its ads from “‘sham issue ads’ that ask 
hearers to call candidates, even non-incumbents, about something vague, 
abstract, unfocused, and/or possibly in the past.”142  WRTL claimed that its 
proposed rule was “narrowly tailored”143 with the result that the rules could be 
administered by the courts and the Federal Election Commission without 
undue burdens.144  WRTL sought to underscore this point by identifying 
communications that would not be treated as grassroots lobbying but would 
remain subject to the financing requirements of BCRA § 203.145 
 
 140. Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 72, at 5–6, which identified the following sixteen 
factors that: 
indicate that the broadcast ads are authentic grass-roots lobbying and not electioneering: 
(1) they concern only a legislative matter; (2) the only reference to a clearly-identified 
federal candidate is a statement urging the public to contact the candidate and ask that he 
take a particular position on the legislative matter; (3) the ads contain no reference to any 
political party; (4) they contain no reference to the candidate’s record or position on any 
issue; (5) they contain no reference to the candidate’s character, qualifications or fitness 
for office; (6) they contain no reference to the candidate’s election or candidacy; (7) they 
focus on particular or specific, pending legislative action as opposed to a general issue; 
(8) they contain no words that promote. support, attack, or oppose a candidate; (9) they 
contain information for the person whom the communication urges the audience to 
contact (by reference to a website); (10) the federal candidate referenced is an incumbent; 
(11) the ads identify two incumbent Senators; (12) they refer to a candidate and non-
candidate and deal with them equally; (13) they deal with currently ongoing legislative 
action that was reported to be coming to a head during the prohibition period and the 
timing of the legislative action was beyond the control of the communicator; (14) they 
dealt with an issue in which the communicator had a clear and long-held interest; (15) 
they were run outside the prohibition period as well as within them (had injunctive relief 
been permitted); (16) they could have been run only with money from a “segregated bank 
account” under 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(2)(E) (only donations from qualified individuals) if 
necessary to obtain injunctive relief. 
Id. 
 141. Brief for Appellee, supra note 76, at 58. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 72, at 29. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Reply Brief for Appellant at 19 n.21, Wis. Right To Life v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410 (2005), 
(No. 04-1581) (citing Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 70, at 29) (“What would be excluded 
by these facts and definition?  There could be no ads naming candidates that were not 
incumbents.  There could be no ads about a candidate’s past votes, or general voting pattern, or 
possible vote on legislation that might later be introduced.  There could be no ads about a 
candidate’s perceived misconduct toward his wife or intern, or whether taxes were withheld and 
paid for a nanny decades ago.  Candidates could not be branded liberal or right-wing, pro- or anti-
gun, pro- or anti-abortion, pro- or anti-environment, pro- or anti-globalism, pro- or anti-
education, pro- or anti-gay, or even Democrat, Republican, Libertarian, or independent.  Nor 
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By devoting this degree of effort to defining grassroots lobbying, WRTL 
accepted its burden to characterize the speech represented by its ads and thus, 
by implication, the existence of more than one constitutionally significant form 
of political speech.  Chief Justice Roberts ignored this approach because he 
articulated an agenda based on “political speech,” not on types of political 
speech.146  Although he restored the concept of express advocacy to a central 
role in the analysis of electioneering communications and set forth a definition 
of the functional equivalent of express advocacy that will exclude from its 
coverage anything short of a direct endorsement or, possibly attacks on a 
person’s character, the larger corporate political speech agenda is aimed at 
political speech without differentiation. 
How narrow or broad an as-applied challenge decided under the grassroots 
lobbying claim might have been would have depended on how the Court 
specified the concept of a legislative nexus.  If the Court had required that the 
legislative action be imminent, for example, rather than simply pending or 
likely or possible, the ruling would have been very narrow.  If the Court had 
required that the text of the ad specifically identify the pending legislation, this 
would have also narrowed the scope of the decision.147 
Third, the Court could have relaxed the strict requirements for the 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life exception, allowing WRTL to be treated as a 
“qualified nonprofit organization.”  While it rejected the alternative of using its 
PAC, WRTL claimed that it should be treated as a “qualified nonprofit 
organization” based on the reasoning but not the specific requirements of FEC 
v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL).148  MCFL dealt with the question of 
whether funding of a voter guide was a permissible independent expenditure 
for federal election law purposes.149  The Court held that the corporate 
expenditure ban did not apply because MCFL was a nonprofit advocacy 
organization funded solely by contributions from individuals who shared the 
organization’s purposes and wished to support its activities.150  The holding in 
the case became the basis for a regulation under federal election law.151 
 
could they be scrutinized as to the sufficiency or conduct of their military service.  Elections and 
candidacy could not be mentioned.”)). 
 146. See infra Part IV. 
 147. Whether either of these approaches would have been consistent with WRTL's as-applied 
challenge is not the main focus here.  It is worth noting, however, that the controversy over the 
timing of the ad in relation to Senate action on filibusters raises at least some questions about the 
outcome. 
 148. See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 264 (1986). 
 149. Id. at 251–52. 
 150. Id. at 263–64. 
 151. See 11 C.F.R. § 114.10 (2005). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] CORPORATE POLITICAL SPEECH 289 
WRTL agreed that it was not a “qualified nonprofit corporation” because it 
accepted contributions from corporations as well as from individuals.152  
Nevertheless, it claimed that “WRTL is in fact quite like an MCFL-type 
corporation because it is an ideological, nonstock, nonprofit (§ 501(c)(4)) 
corporation.”153  WRTL argued that “[t]he fact that a corporation does not meet 
‘qualified nonprofit corporation’ status, because of some minimal business 
activity or receipts from corporations, should not matter for present purposes, 
however, because corporate money may be used for grassroots lobbying 
anyway.”154  Indeed, WRTL claimed that “[t]here is also no compelling 
interest in regulation of corporations even as to candidate elections with 
respect to MCFL-type corporations.”155  WRTL further noted that the Court in 
McConnell held that the electioneering communication provision could not be 
applied to MCFL-type corporations.156  This alternative based on a 
modification of the MCFL requirements was also inconsistent with both the 
corporate speech agenda and the political speech framework. 
Fourth, in light of its desire to accept corporate contributions to its general 
treasury and in light of its objections to using its existing PAC, WRTL 
proposed financing its grassroots lobbying ads through “a separate bank 
account to which only qualified individuals may donate, as defined in 2 U.S.C. 
§ 434(f)(2)(E).”157  This would be a segregated fund within its general treasury 
that was not subject to the solicitation and disclosure limitation applicable to 
PACs but accepted contributions only from individuals.158 
Pursuing these alternatives would have left the PAC alternative in place for 
broadcast communications that are electioneering communications but not 
grassroots lobbying communications.  Defining a narrow exception would 
have left the prohibitions on the use of corporate treasury funds in place and, to 
that extent, would have been inconsistent with the corporate political speech 
agenda and with the larger political speech framework.  It would also have 
been inconsistent with the majority’s insistence that strict scrutiny does not 
permit contextual analysis of intent or purpose or most other factors outside of 
the four corners of the text of the broadcast communication.159  In sum, basing 
the outcome on characterization of the speech would have undermined the 
 
 152. Brief for Appellant, supra note 76, at 31 (citing 11 C.F.R. § 114.10 (2005)). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Reply Brief for Appellant, supra note 145, at 15 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 
211 (2003)). 
 157. Brief for Appellee, supra note 76, at i. 
 158. It is possible that WRTL did not elaborate on its claims relating to restricting fundraising 
to individuals in part because it wanted to propose this alternative which embraces precisely this 
restriction on its fundraising. 
 159. See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2007) (principal opinion). 
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claims relating to corporate speakers and would have supported a narrow 
result.  It would have left BCRA and McConnell largely intact. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS OF WRTL II FOR THE POLITICAL SPEECH FRAMEWORK 
The principal opinion and the concurring opinions all embrace a political 
speech framework.  This is the central jurisprudential point going forward.  
However, in articulating this framework, as useful as it has been for defining 
the corporate political speech agenda, the Court has also now come face-to-
face with certain  larger issues that it has been artfully sidestepping since it 
entered the campaign finance wing of the political thicket. 
WRTL II was a case about financing political speech.  Chief Justice 
Roberts referred to BCRA in terms of bans and prohibitions on speech.  Yet, 
one of the central facts of the case, largely unremarked upon in the principal or 
the concurring opinions, was that WRTL could have run its ads throughout the 
primary and general election periods in perfect conformity with BCRA § 203 
had it used funds from its controlled PAC.  WRTL admitted this.160  No one 
challenged this, but only the dissent mentioned it.161 
Three fundamental questions emerge from this fact.  The first question is 
whether money is speech.  The second issue is whether a corporation is a 
person for purposes of particular types of speech in the context of an election 
for public office.  The third question is whose speech rights are at issue: an 
individual’s rights to speak and associate, the rights of the associations as 
entities, or both.  Implementing the corporate political speech agenda on a 
principled basis will require the current majority to confront these issues.  
Implementing the democratic integrity agenda will require that the dissent 
develop principled arguments for putting these questions back at the core of 
campaign finance jurisprudence.  The way to begin is to recognize that 
campaign finance is about money, and questions about money are always 
questions about transactions. 
The question of whether money is speech has simmered in the background 
of campaign finance jurisprudence without resolution.162  No one disagrees that 
money is needed to facilitate speech, but this is not the same question as 
whether money itself constitutes speech. 
 
 160. Brief for Appellee, supra note 76, at 25. 
 161. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 2697–98, 2700 n.17, 2702–03 (2007) 
(Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
 162. See generally J. Skelly Wright, Comment, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money 
Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1004–05 (1976) (arguing that the view that money is speech 
“misconceives the First Amendment”); J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is 
the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 631–32 (1982) 
(equating political spending with speech led to perverse results). 
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The most recent consideration of whether money is speech came in 
Buckley.  The per curiam opinion rejected placing campaign finance in a 
framework distinguishing conduct from speech.163  The Court of Appeals had 
relied on United States v. O’Brien, a case upholding a conviction for burning a 
draft card.164  In O’Brien, the Court found that burning a draft card involved 
both “symbolic speech” protected by the First Amendment, and a “nonspeech 
element” that was “unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”165  The 
Court upheld O’Brien’s conviction because it found “a sufficiently important 
governmental interest in regulating that nonspeech element” and found further 
that this governmental interest was “unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression” and had an “incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment 
freedoms . . . no greater than [was] essential to the furtherance of that 
interest.”166 
The Buckley Court rejected the circuit court’s reliance on O’Brien, 
concluding that “[t]he expenditure of money simply cannot be equated with 
such conduct as destruction of a draft card.”167  The Court found not only a 
complex relationship between speech and money but also a relationship that 
would differ based the facts of particular cases.  The Court observed that 
“[s]ome forms of communication made possible by the giving and spending of 
money involve speech alone, some involve conduct primarily, and some 
involve a combination of the two.”168  The Court nevertheless served notice 
that it would disregard these fact-based distinctions, observing, “this Court has 
never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of 
money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the 
exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment.”169  The Court then noted 
that money is important to all forms of communication and to “effective 
political speech.”170 It concluded that “[a] restriction on the amount of money a 
person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign 
necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of 
issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience 
 
 163. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1976). 
 164. Id. at 16. 
 165. See e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (sustaining conviction 
for burning draft card even though it involved “symbolic speech” because the government had a 
sufficiently important interest in regulating the “nonspeech element” that was “unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression”). 
 166. Id. at 376–77. 
 167. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 19. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
292 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVII:267 
reached.”171  Having based its analysis on “political communication,” the 
Court then had to retrofit its analysis to take account of its decision to uphold 
contribution limitations but to strike down expenditure limitation except when 
those expenditures involve express advocacy. 
The Court has not directly addressed the issue of whether or in what ways 
money is speech since Buckley.  The Court has addressed this issue obliquely 
in cases dealing with contribution limitations.  Under what circumstances 
might contribution limits be so restrictive that they constitute a burden on the 
speech rights protected under the First Amendment?172  Justice Stevens, who 
did not take part in Buckley, wrote a concurring opinion in Nixon v. Shrink to 
emphasize that “[m]oney is property; it is not speech.”173  These questions are 
not the same as the fundamental question of whether money itself, without 
regard to amount, is speech.  The question that the Court has not addressed is 
whether there can be too much money from a single source for a particular 
type of speech in the context of a federal election.  This is not a question of 
equalizing amounts contributed or expended.  The Court in Buckley focused on 
the quantity of speech but never considered diversity of speech.  It never 
considered the case of whether permitting one corporate entity to purchase all 
of the available air time in a particular media market for the purpose of 
repeating the same broadcast communication throughout the campaign 
enhanced the kind of quantity of political speech that the Court has come to 
conflate with enhancing public discussion consistent with the First 
Amendment. 
The second question is whether a corporation has the same speech rights as 
an individual in the context of a candidate election.  The Supreme Court side-
stepped this question in Bellotti, which involved corporate expenditures in 
connection with a ballot measure, not corporate contributions in a candidate 
election.174  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted the Buckley 
Court’s rejection of the distinction between speech and conduct in the political 
speech context175 and then directed attention to “a more basic question here 
involved, namely, whether business corporation, such as the plaintiffs, have 
 
 171. Id.  This observation raises an important issue, not further addressed here, about the 
Court's reliance on hypothesized facts.  The current limits on contributions and on certain 
independent expenditures do not appear to have had any of these results.  The Court's hypothesis 
does not appear to take account of saturation advertising based on repetition of the same ad or the 
rise of the ubiquitous thirty second ads that seem to convey little information. 
 172. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000); see also Randall v. Sorrell, 548 
U.S. 230 (2006). 
 173. Nixon , 528 U.S. at 398 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 174. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 777–79 (1978). 
 175. The First National Bank of Boston v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. 773, 783 (Mass. 
1977).  For a discussion of the distinction between speech and conduct in Buckley, see supra Part 
II.B. 
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First Amendment rights coextensive with those of natural persons or 
associations of natural persons.”176  The Massachusetts Court held that “[i]t 
seems clear to us that a corporation does not have the same First Amendment 
rights to free speech as those of a natural person, but, whether its rights are 
designated ‘liberty’ rights or ‘property’ rights, a corporation’s property and 
business interests are entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection. . . .  It is 
also clear that, as an incident of such protection, corporations possess certain 
rights of speech and expression under the First Amendment.”177  Based on this 
analysis, the Massachusetts Court held that “only when a general political issue 
materially affects a corporation’s business, property or assets may that 
corporation claim First Amendment protection for its speech or other activities 
entitling it to communicate its position on that issue to the general public.178 
The United State Supreme Court reversed the Massachusetts Court and 
went to considerable length to reject its reasoning.179  The Supreme Court 
recast the issue from a question of the rights of corporate speakers to a 
question of what rights the First Amendment protects, reasoning as follows: 
The court below framed the principal question in this case as whether and to 
what extent corporations have First Amendment rights.  We believe that the 
court posed the wrong question.  The constitution often protects interests 
broader than those of the parting seeking their vindication.  The First 
Amendment, in particular, serves significant societal interests.  The proper 
question therefore is not whether corporations “have” First Amendment rights 
and, if so, whether they are coextensive with those of natural persons.  Instead 
the question must be whether § 8 [in the Massachusetts statute at issue in the 
case] abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect.180 
The Court found that the speech at issue, support for or opposition to a 
referendum measure on a proposed state constitutional amendment that would 
authorize a graduated personal income tax, “is at the heart of the First 
Amendment’s protections.”181  The Court then concluded that “[t]he question 
in this case, simply put, is whether the corporate identity of the speaker 
deprives this proposed speech of what otherwise would be its clear entitlement 
to protection.”182  The Court held that “[i]n the realm of protected speech, the 
legislature is constitutionally disqualified from dictating the subjects about 
which persons may speak and the speakers who may address a public issue.”183 
 
 176. First National Bank of Boston, 371 Mass. at 783. 
 177. Id. at 784. 
 178. Id. at 785. 
 179. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 775–88. 
 180. Id. at 776. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 778. 
 183. Id. at 784–85. 
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The court found no compelling government interest in limiting the speech 
at issue based on the identity of the speakers.  It rejected both the idea of 
protecting the role of the individual citizens and protecting the rights of 
shareholders.184  In language that is now commonly overlooked, the Court 
observed “[h]owever weighty these interests may be in the context of partisan 
candidate elections, they are not implicated in this case, or are not served at all, 
or in other than a random manner by the prohibition in § 8.”185  In a footnote 
relating to this reasoning, the Court makes its distinction between ballot 
measure referenda and candidate elections quite clear.186  Noting that 
prohibitions on a corporate contributions to candidates or candidate 
committees or “other means of influencing candidate elections” were not at 
issue in this case, the Court observed that “[t]he overriding concern behind the 
enactment of statutes such as the Federal Corrupt Practices Act was the 
problem of corruption of elected representatives through the creation of 
political ads” and stated that “[t]he importance of governmental interest in 
preventing this occurrence has never been doubted.”187  The Court then state 
explicitly that “our consideration of a corporation’s right to speak on issues of 
general public interest implies no comparable right in the quite different 
context of participation in a political campaign for election to public office.”188 
These two approaches to the role of corporations in public discourse might 
well provide the foundation for a much-needed consideration of the issue in 
light of contemporary experience.  The Roberts Court appears unlikely to 
undertake this task, which might well make its efforts to implement the 
corporate political speech agenda more difficult.  Instead, the new majority on 
campaign finance jurisprudence in WRTL II embraced the reasoning of Justice 
Kennedy’s dissent in Austen, which castigated the majority in that case for its 
“hostility to the corporate form” and claimed that such hostility makes the 
Court itself the censor rather than the protector of the speech rights protected 
under the First Amendment.189 
The third question is closely related to the second but not coextensive with 
it.  While the second question focused directly on speech, the third question 
addresses the relationship between speech and association.  Even if a corporate 
entity has the same First Amendment rights as an individual, this does not 
resolve the question of the relationship between the entity and its members or 
contributors.  If a corporate entity does not have the same First Amendment 
rights as an individual, then the corporate entity derives its rights from its 
 
 184. Id. at 786–87. 
 185. Id. at 787–88. 
 186. Id. at 788 n.26. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 713 (1990). 
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members or contributors.  If the corporate entity’s rights are derivative, then 
the rights of the members or contributors within the corporate entity are central 
issues for a political speech framework.  If the corporate entity is treated as 
having its own independent rights of political speech, then questions of 
association and of the rights of members or contributors are at best, secondary 
in a political speech framework but would remain primary in a democratic 
integrity framework. 
The core issue is whether a corporate entity has its own First Amendment 
rights or whether it derives these rights from its members and what difference 
the possible answers to this question make.  There are three broad patterns for 
analyzing the relationship between an organization and its members, or, if one 
prefers, between members and their organization: (I) both the members and the 
corporate entity might be treated as having independent rights under the First 
Amendment; (ii) corporate entities might be treated as deriving First 
Amendment rights from their members; or (iii) members might be treated as 
having waived certain of their First Amendment rights once they join or 
transfer funds to a corporate entity.  It is entirely possible that each of these 
patterns might be constitutionally permissible in particular circumstances 
depending on the nature of the corporate entity and its relationship with its 
members or contributors.  For example, business corporations might be treated 
differently than membership organizations established for purposes of policy 
advocacy or political committees organized for explicit purposes of contesting 
candidate elections.  These questions far exceed the scope of this article.  The 
point here is that campaign finance jurisprudence cannot credibly rest on 
invocation of First Amendment rights unless it grapples with the thorny issues 
of whose rights are being protected. 
IV.  IMPLEMENTING THE CORPORATE SPEECH AGENDA AFTER WRTL II 
Implementing the corporate political speech agenda does not follow 
seamlessly from WRTL II.  This is certainly the case with respect to the longer 
term agenda of rolling back, or even overturning, FECA, but it is also true with 
respect to the more proximate corporate political speech agenda.  To 
implement the corporate political speech agenda, the Court must overcome the 
following three challenges: (1) clarifying the tenuous premises embedded in 
the political speech framework, (2) overturning the campaign finance 
precedents that are inconsistent with the agenda, and (3) limiting congressional 
authority over campaign finance and, more broadly, the conduct of elections.  
WRTL II ignores the first challenge, begins with the process of addressing the 
second, and accords the third a more prominent place in the campaign finance 
agenda than it has previously received.  Ignoring the tenuous premises of the 
political speech framework will prove effective unless and until the proponents 
of the democratic integrity framework more effectively address these premises 
within their own framework.  The Court will necessarily focus on the second 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
296 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVII:267 
obstacle, which has been created by its own precedents.  As is discussed more 
fully below, the Court’s continued interest in confining the role of Congress in 
campaign finance matters encounters the inevitable continuation of Article I of 
the Constitution and the difficulty of imposing a rigid separation of powers 
interpretation on the constitutional structure that would leave the Court in 
exclusive control of the First Amendment.190 
Implementing the corporate political speech agenda depends on 
reinterpreting or overruling precedents that distinguish corporate speakers from 
individual speakers and that distinguish among types of political speech.  Fully 
implementing the corporate speech agenda is inconsistent with the central 
elements of FECA.191  The first step on this path is to overrule Austin, MCFL, 
Buckley and McConnell.  The second step is to entrench Bellotti at the center 
of campaign finance jurisprudence. 
The members of the new majority in WRTL II do not agree on how this is 
to be done.  Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy have written dissents that 
provide templates for recasting campaign finance jurisprudence.  Justice 
Scalia’s concurring opinion in WRTL II provides a quick reference and, in 
some instances, even detailed citations to these opinions.192 
Chief Justice Roberts’ approach in WRTL II suggests that this enterprise 
will not be accomplished in one seminal opinion or by the directly overruling 
prior cases.  His opinion offers no indication that he is seeking to probe the 
limits of stare decisis in any direct sense.  Justice Scalia’s breezy effort to 
minimize the significance of stare decisis, relying on the mother of all string 
cites,193 is unlikely to persuade Chief Justice Roberts or others in the new 
majority as they ponder the likely life of their opinions.194  As the dissent 
observes in WRTL II, rejecting this approach will not make the direction and 
magnitude of the change begun in WRTL II any less important.195  On this 
point, the concurrence seems less certain than the dissent.  It seems likely that 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence was written to signal as strongly as possible that 
three Justices have doubts about the usefulness of Chief Justice Roberts’ 
reasoning as a predicate for implementing the corporate speech agenda. 
The problems posed by Chief Justice Roberts approach are apparent in his 
principal opinion, particularly in Parts III and IV, which Justices Scalia, 
Thomas and Kennedy pointedly did not join.  Chief Justice Roberts carefully 
and cannily cited the majority opinions of the very cases that the WRTL II 
majority agree must be overturned.  While the reasoning and the results are 
 
 190. See infra Part V. 
 191. See supra Part I.B. 
 192. See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 2676–84 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 193. Id. at 2685 n.9. 
 194. See id. at 2685. 
 195. Id. at 2702 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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derived from the dissents in these cases, Chief Justice Roberts’ citation of the 
majority opinions represents a gamble that he can effectively reinterpret these 
cases so that they can be separated from the democratic integrity framework 
and recast as elements of the political speech framework.  This carries the risk 
that the reinterpretation cannot be made sufficiently persuasive to overcome, at 
least in the long run and perhaps with a different Court, the continued 
precedential value of these cases when interpreted in a manner consistent with 
their own facts and their holdings. 
Containing this risk involves an understanding of how the principal 
opinion used these precedents.  Indeed, it is a picture of referencing phrases for 
purposes at variance with the facts and holdings of the precedents.  The 
fundamental cleverness of his approach was to cite the cases that Justice Scalia 
wishes to overturn in support of a more central role for Bellotti.  This exercise 
is apparent in the Chief Justice’s use of Austin and MCFL to support his 
position by detaching phrases from the facts and the holding in each case.  
Chief Justice Roberts proved beyond a doubt that he is a master of the 
“lawyer’s game” that he decried so passionately in his dissent in Massachusetts 
v. Environmental Protection Agency.196 
The logic of the principal opinion in WRTL II comes from Bellotti, where 
the Court found that the central question is not the character of the speaker but 
the nature of the First Amendment right.197  But, the principal opinion in WRTL 
II does not cite Bellotti for this proposition or for any other proposition relating 
to the rights of corporate speakers.  Instead, it cites Bellotti for propositions 
relating to mootness198 and strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard of 
review.199  The principal opinion cites Bellotti to the effect that the PAC option 
would justify regulation of all corporate speech, which the Court rejected in 
Bellotti.200  Extending a ban on corporate speech to issue advocacy would be 
inconsistent with Bellotti, which held that corporate identity did not strip a 
corporation of all free speech rights.201 
The most important element of Chief Justice Roberts’ use of Bellotti is 
what he did not say about the case, namely, that Bellotti involved a 
 
 196. Mass. v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1471 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  In his 
unvarnished condemnation of the what the Chief Justice regarded as the Court’s imprudent 
dilution of the Article III standing requirement, he accused the Court of making the standing 
requirements “utterly manipulable” and of making standing “a lawyer's game, rather than a 
fundamental limitation ensuring that courts function as courts and not intrude on the politically 
accountable branches.”  Id. 
 197. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978). 
 198. WRTL II, 127 S.Ct. at 2662-63, (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 774). 
 199. Id. at 2664 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786). 
 200. Id. at 2671 n.9, (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777–78). 
 201. Id. at 2673 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778). 
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referendum, which is a form of legislation, not a candidate election.202  By 
simply ignoring this fact, Chief Justice Roberts claimed that the rights of 
corporate speakers existed without regard to the context of the speech.  In light 
of his emphasis on the distinctions among express advocacy, functional 
equivalents of express advocacy, and issue advocacy, which he blurred into the 
generic category of political speech.  Chief Justice Roberts took the position 
that these distinctions have constitutional significance but that the distinction 
between referenda and candidate elections does not.  This approach, whatever 
its ultimate constitutional merit, saved Chief Justice Roberts from having to 
account for the Bellotti Court’s own position that the distinction between 
referenda and candidate elections may matter.  Dealing with this issue would 
have eroded the force using Bellotti, oblique as it was, and would have raised 
questions about the Chief Justice’s insistence that his test for determining 
whether a broadcast ad was the functional equivalent of express advocacy 
should not be based on contextual factors.  Presumably, he dismissed the 
distinction between a referendum and a candidate election as constitutionally 
irrelevant, and indeed, an inappropriate contextual factor.  Simply ignoring 
these nettlesome issues makes an opinion more elegant and more persuasive as 
long as one has a majority, but it may not serve as a solid long term foundation 
for implementing and maintaining the corporate speech agenda. 
The more proximate agenda item is to eliminate the PAC alternative to the 
use of a corporation’s general treasury funds.  This means that Austin must be 
overturned, which has long been a goal of the Justices who are now in the 
WRTL II majority.  Justice Scalia’s concurrence denounced Austin as a 
“significant departure from ancient First Amendment Principles”203 and 
declared flatly that the case was “wrongly decided.”204  Justice Scalia took 
some pains to trace the history of opposition to Austin, in part because the 
McConnell majority based its reasoning on claims of an unbroken history of 
reform during the past century.  Justice Scalia did not explain what particular 
ancient principles supported his position on corporate political speech.  
Instead, he cited a series of dissents relating to the requirement that corporate 
entities participate in candidate elections through their controlled PACs.205 
Justice Kennedy’s dissent in McConnell is a template for the new 
framework set forth by Chief Justice Roberts in WRTL II.206  Justice Kennedy 
 
 202. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 769. 
 203. WRTL II, 127 S.Ct. at 2679 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. (citing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 695–713 (1989) 
(Kennedy J., dissenting); id. at 679–95 (Scalia, J., dissenting); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 
257–59 (Scalia J., dissenting); id. at 325–30 (Kennedy J., dissenting); id. at 273–75 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting)). 
 206. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 322–41 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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relied centrally on Bellotti when claiming that Austin should be overruled.207  
He asserted that “the majority’s ready willingness to equate corruption with all 
organizations adopting the corporate form is a grave insult to nonprofit and 
for-profit corporations alike, entities that have long enriched our civic 
dialogue.”208  He rejected reliance on justifications based on aggregation of 
wealth or concerns about the shareholders and members of corporations and 
unions as adequate justifications for burdens on the First Amendment rights of 
those institutions.209  Like Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy adopted a 
framework based on the speech rights of corporate speakers. 
While Chief Justice Roberts’ views certainly reflect and incorporate these 
prior dissents, he solved the central conceptual problem posed by Bellotti as a 
precedent, namely, the Bellotti Court’s distinction between corporate speech in 
the context of a referendum and corporate speech in the context of a candidate 
election.  The Bellotti Court, noting that “[a]ppellants do not challenge the 
constitutionality of laws prohibiting or limiting corporate contributions to 
political candidates or committee, or other means of influencing candidate 
elections,” stated clearly that its “consideration of a corporation’s right to 
speak on issues of general public interest implies no comparable right in the 
quite different context of participation in a political campaign for election to 
public office.”210 
The question of overturning Buckley was considered again in Nixon v. 
Shrink, which involved state limits on contributions to state political 
candidates.211  Justice Souter grounded his opinion upholding the State of 
Missouri’s contribution limits in a democratic integrity framework and found 
in Buckley ample precedent for doing so.212 
Justice Kennedy wrote a sharply worded dissent in Nixon.213  He called 
upon the Court to overturn Buckley because it had created “covert speech” for 
the purpose of evading the contribution limits.214  Examples of covert speech, 
such as soft money contributions to political parties and “so-called issue 
advocacy advertisements that promote or attack a candidate’s positions without 
specifically urging his or her election or defeat,” were a more serious problem 
than the ills Buckley purported to address.215  This result, according to Justice 
Kennedy, “mocks the First Amendment.”216  He would have overturned 
 
 207. Id. at 324–28; see also Austin, 494 U.S. at 695–713 (Kennedy J., dissenting). 
 208. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 325–26. 
 209. Id. at 327. 
 210. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978). 
 211. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 381–82 (2000). 
 212. Id. at 391–95 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975)). 
 213. Id. at 405–10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 214. Id. at 406–07. 
 215. Id. at 406. 
 216. Id. at 407. 
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Buckley and “then free[d] Congress or state legislatures to attempt some new 
reform, if, based upon their own considered view of the First Amendment, it 
[was] possible to do so.”217  As of 1997, Justice Kennedy had not abandoned 
the theory that Congress was entitled to its own view of the First Amendment 
in this matter. 
Justice Thomas has also consistently argued in his dissents that Buckley 
should be overturned.  He argued that political speech is at the core of the First 
Amendment and thus outside the reach of any government entity.  Indeed, he 
believes many of the errors in campaign finance have been inflicted on the 
public by the courts.  He has reserved his most stinging criticism for what he 
describes as the Court’s willingness to “balance away First Amendment 
freedoms.”218  This observation was based on his insistent application of strict 
scrutiny, as opposed to claims that Congress had no authority in this area. 
The new majority is currently engaged in an internal debate over whether 
to overrule the Court’s campaign finance precedents explicitly or indirectly.  
The outcome is by no means certain, and this article makes no predictions.  It 
has focused instead on the implications of these precedents for implementing 
the corporate political speech agenda, which, if fully implemented, would 
leave little if any of the provisions of FECA and the Court’s precedents in 
place. 
The Court’s emerging balance of powers concerns in the campaign finance 
area serves notice that the Court’s overruling of these precedents does not 
mean that the Court regards campaign finance as an area of congressional 
initiative. 
V.  POLITICAL SPEECH AND THE BALANCE OF POWERS 
The McConnell majority referred repeatedly to the Court’s deference to 
Congress in the areas of political speech and the broad scope of Congress’s 
authority to legislate in this area.219  This is not a new concept and is found in 
Buckley and other cases.  In Buckley, the Court did not question congressional 
authority even as it struck down the limitation on expenditures. 220 
In WRTL II, the new majority challenged Congressional authority to 
legislate on matters involving campaign finance.  This development follows 
from the consolidation of the political speech framework and enhances its 
entrenchment.  Balance of powers concerns are linked to the language of the 
First Amendment, which begins, “Congress shall make no law. . . .”221  As 
 
 217. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. at 409–10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 218. Id. at 410 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 219. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 117, 137 (2003). 
 220. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 131–32 (1975) (per curiam). 
 221. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  Chief Justice Roberts emphasized the importance of this 
language, stating: 
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campaign finance is viewed solely as a First Amendment matter, this language 
is being given a more literal interpretation by the new majority. 
This trend is controversial.  It is one thing for the Court to hold that 
Congress has taken a constitutionally impermissible approach in campaign 
finance legislation.  It is quite another thing for the Court, or some on the 
Court, to suggest that Congress has no authority, or only very limited authority, 
to address these issues at all.  This is a claim of a judicial pre-clearance 
authority, a claim that the Court may define the scope of congressional 
authority.  It is reminiscent of the claim in City of Boerne v. Flores, where the 
Court held that Congress can enact legislation only after the Court had 
declared that a constitutional right exists, and then only if the legislation is 
narrowly tailored remedial legislation.222  If anything, the concurring opinion 
in WRTL II makes even greater claims to the effect that Congress should not be 
permitted any role in campaign finance matters. 
The beginning of the more explicit debate over the scope of congressional 
authority appeared in Nixon v. Missouri Shrink PAC, particularly in Justice 
Breyer’s concurrence and Justice Kennedy’s dissent.223  Nixon was decided 
three years after City of Boerne and two years after another important balance 
of powers case, Clinton v. City of New York, in which the Court held that 
Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact the Line Item Veto Act.224  
Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in City of Boerne and a concurring 
opinion dealing with the balance of powers in Clinton.  Both provide insight 
into his subsequent dissents in Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC and McConnell based in 
part on quite different concepts of the balance of powers. 
In Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, Justice Breyer observed that “the legislature 
understands the problem—the threat to electoral integrity, the need for 
democratization—better than do we.”225  That being the case, Justice Breyer 
 
as is often the case in this Court's First Amendment opinions, we have gotten this far in 
the analysis without quoting the Amendment itself: “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech.”  The Framers’ actual words put these cases in proper 
perspective.  Our jurisprudence over the past 216 years has rejected an absolutist 
interpretation of those words, but when it comes to drawing difficult lines in the area of 
pure political speech—between what is protected and what the Government may ban—it 
is worth recalling the language we are applying. 
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life 127 S.Ct. 2652, 2674 (2007) (principal opinion) (quoting U.S. CONST. 
amend. I). 
 222. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518–20 (1997).  But see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 
384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
 223. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. at 400 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 406 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
 224. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448–49 (1997). 
 225. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC 528 U.S. at 403 (Breyer, J., concurring) (referring to the 
legislature of the State of Missouri); see also STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING 
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concluded, referring to the legislature, that “[w]e should defer to its political 
judgment that unlimited spending threatens the integrity of the electoral 
process.”226  But Justice Breyer was not arguing for unbounded deference to 
the legislature, concluding that “we should not defer in respect to whether its 
solution, by imposing too low a contribution limit, significantly increases the 
reputation-related or media-related advantages of incumbency and thereby 
insulates legislators from effective electoral challenge.”227  He concluded that 
Buckley “might be interpreted as embodying sufficient flexibility for the 
problem at hand.”228  At the same time, Justice Breyer made it clear that he 
was willing to reconsider Buckley: 
What if I am wrong about Buckley?  Suppose Buckley denies the political 
branches sufficient leeway to enact comprehensive solutions to the problems 
posed by campaign finance.  If so, like Justice Kennedy, I believe the 
Constitution would require us to reconsider Buckley.229 
Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC was written from a 
perspective rooted solely in the First Amendment.  At this stage, Justice 
Kennedy concluded that he “would leave open the possibility that Congress, or 
a state legislature, might devise a system in which there are some limits on 
both expenditures and contributions, thus permitting officeholders to 
concentrate their time and efforts on official duties rather than on 
fundraising.”230  Justice Kennedy wanted to overrule Buckley “and then free 
Congress or state legislatures to attempt some new reform, if, based upon their 
own considered view of the First Amendment, it is possible to do so.”231  Three 
years later when the Court decided McConnell, both Justice Breyer and Justice 
Kennedy had moved beyond this kind of flexibility. 
The McConnell majority made the long legislative history of campaign 
finance reforms the centerpiece of its opinion.  To the McConnell majority, this 
was a narrative on the role of the people’s elected representatives protecting 
the institutions and processes of democracy from special interests.232  This 
history of congressional engagement was cited repeatedly to support the 
majority’s interpretation of BCRA.233 
 
OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, 46-9 (2005) (where the themes in his concurring opinion also 
appear). 
 226. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. at 403–04 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 227. Id. at 404. 
 228. Id.  At the same time, Justice Breyer observed that “it might prove possible to reinterpret 
aspects of Buckley in light of the post-Buckley experience stressed by Justice Kennedy.”  Id. at 
405. 
 229. Id. at 405. 
 230. Id. at 409 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 231. Id. at 409–10. 
 232. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 189–210 (2003). 
 233. See id. 
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The dissents in McConnell rejected this reliance on the history of 
congressional action, which they tended to see as a narrative of incumbent 
politicians’ use of public office to limit the First Amendment rights of the 
people.234  Justice Kennedy’s dissent in McConnell took direct aim at 
Congress.  He pointedly observed that 
Buckley did not authorize Congress to decide what shapes and forms the 
national political dialogue is to take.  To reach today’s decision, the Court 
surpasses Buckley’s limits and expands Congress’ regulatory power.  In so 
doing, it replaces discrete and respected First Amendment principles with new, 
amorphous, and unsound rules, rules which dismantle basic protections for 
speech.235 
Justice Kennedy did not hesitate to charge that Congress cannot be trusted with 
the First Amendment, describing BCRA as “an effort by Congress to ensure 
that civic discourse takes place only through the modes of its choosing.”236  
The electioneering communication provisions were, in Justice Kennedy’s 
view, no exception to this general assessment but instead “demonstrate 
Congress’ fundamental misunderstanding of the First Amendment.”237  Indeed, 
he charges that Congress enacted BCRA § 204 knowing that it is 
unconstitutional.238  In light of this track record, Justice Kennedy concludes 
that “we cannot cede authority to the Legislature to do with the First 
Amendment as it pleases.”239 
Consistent with this conclusion, Justice Kennedy would require evidence 
that “the Legislature has established that the regulated conduct has inherent 
corruption potential, thus justifying the inference that regulating the conduct 
will stem from the appearance of real corruption.”240  In other words, Congress 
cannot make this judgment based on its own experience but must satisfy the 
Court that it has established an empirical predicate based on the “inherent” 
qualities of the conduct.  As a result, according to Justice Kennedy, “the Court 
today should not ask, as it does, whether some persons, even Members of 
Congress, conclusorily assert that the regulated conduct appears corrupt to 
them.”241  The Court instead must ask “whether the conduct now prohibited 
inherently poses a real or substantive quid pro quo danger, so that its 
regulation will stem the appearance of quid pro quo corruption.”242  In 
 
 234. Id. at 249–50 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 235. Id. at 286–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). 
 236. Id. at 287. 
 237. Id. at 339. 
 238. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 339 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in 
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 239. Id. at 330. 
 240. Id. at 297–98. 
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requiring that Congress set forth the evidence on which it based its legislation 
and strongly suggesting that this evidence will be reviewed by the Court, 
Justice Kennedy is applying the standard he set forth in City of Boerne in the 
First Amendment context. 
In WRTL II Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, made 
even more muscular claims about the exclusive authority of the Court to 
interpret and protect the First Amendment.  Justice Scalia cited a remark of 
former House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt to the effect that freedom of 
speech could not be reconciled with “healthy campaigns in a healthy 
democracy” and that it was impossible to have both.243  This would mean that 
the two competing frameworks for campaign finance jurisprudence could 
never be reconciled.  Justice Scalia did not discount this possibility.  He did, 
however, consider what the Court’s role would be if it were possible to have 
both, observing: 
[i]f he was wrong, however, and the two values can coexist, it is pretty clear 
which side of the equation this institution is primarily responsible for.  It is 
perhaps our most important constitutional task to assure freedom of political 
speech.  And when a statute creates a regime as unworkable and 
unconstitutional as today’s effort at as-applied review proves § 203 to be, it is 
our responsibility to decline enforcement.244 
The ideal that the court has particular responsibility for selected parts of 
the Constitution and that this judicial responsibility supports limitation or 
exclusion of other branches of government from these areas is beyond novel.  
A judicial monopoly protects liberty no more than would efforts to strip courts 
of jurisdiction over particular areas of the Constitution.  Balance of powers 
does not mean bartering among the branches for interpretive monopolies. 
Chief Justice Roberts added an explicit concern with limited government 
to the balance of powers analysis in the campaign finance jurisprudence.245  He 
focused explicitly on restraining the judicial branch rather than on excluding 
the legislative branch.246  The Chief Justice found time-consuming discovery 
an impermissible burden on First Amendment rights.247  He concluded that a 
test based on “the actual effect of speech” would “typically lead to a 
burdensome, expert-driven inquiry” that “will unquestionably chill a 
substantial amount of political speech.”248  Chief Justice Roberts concluded 
that is precisely what happened in the WRTL litigation, which he described as 
follows: 
 
 243. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 2686 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 244. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 245. Id. at 2672. 
 246. Id. at 2669. 
 247. WRTL II, 127 S.Ct. at 2666-67 (principal opinion). 
 248. Id. at 2666. 
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Consider what happened in these cases.  The District Court permitted extensive 
discovery on the assumption that WRTL’s intent was relevant.  As a result, the 
defendants deposed WRTL’s executive director, its legislative director, its 
political action committee director, its lead communications consultant, and 
one of its fundraisers.  WRTL also had to turn over many documents related to 
its operations, plans, and finances.  Such litigation constitutes a severe burden 
on political speech.249 
He concluded that the proper test “must entail minimal if any discovery, to 
allow parties to resolve disputes quickly without chilling speech through the 
threat of burdensome litigation.”250 
VI.  FRAMEWORKS FOR DEMOCRACY 
The current tension between two frameworks for campaign finance 
jurisprudence can obscure a central commonality–the shared conviction that 
the frameworks are about competing visions of democracy.  This is a long-
deferred discussion in the political life of the United States.  It is not a 
discussion that can be or should be confined to the Court.251  What role the 
Court plays and on what terms it plays this role is one of the ongoing elements 
of this larger conversation.  The continuing controversy over campaign finance 
reform is part of this larger discussion.  In this discussion, the contested 
elements of the frameworks developed by the Court in its campaign finance 
cases will be tested and perhaps revised. 
The WRTL II framework equates democracy with the marketplace of ideas 
and wants that marketplace freed of intrusive regulation.  The threat to 
democracy is seen as interference with individual and corporate rights to speak 
about issues and candidates in a vigorous exchange of ideas.  The government 
is the problem and should not be allowed to present regulation as a solution.252  
The McConnell framework equates democracy with an active role in elections 
and equal access to the policy process.  The threat to democracy is seen as a 
covert process accessed through hidden influence unrelated to the formal and 
ostensibly public policy process.  Because these issues arise from the operating 
of the public policy process, the government, and notably Congress, must play 
a central role in resolving them.253 
Will these two frameworks define the larger discourse about democracy?  
If they do, what will be gained and lost?  If they do not, what elements are 
missing and how will these missing elements shape the debate over campaign 
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finance jurisprudence?  It may well seem perverse to direct attention to large 
themes at the end of an article on a topic that seems large enough in itself.  But, 
how else is one to understand law and how else is one to understand the 
Constitution?  The Constitution is about the process of a people governing 
themselves.  Just as the Chief Justice thought it important at the end of his 
principal opinion in WRTL II to cite the language of the First Amendment, so, 
too, this article thinks it important and appropriate to cite the language of the 
first sentence of the Constitution: 
We the people of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, to 
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, 
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves 
and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United 
States of America.254 
This is a process that continues today.  “We the people” are still attempting 
to form “a more perfect Union.”  How do the two frameworks for campaign 
finance jurisprudence contribute to this process, and how does the role 
assigned to the people under the Constitution aid in understanding the two 
frameworks? 
The political speech framework of WRTL II is foundational, but the effort 
by the Court to use political speech in an acontextual and mechanistically 
textual manner flies in the face of the very idea of a constitution.  Political 
speech is not an end in itself.  Political speech is inextricably bound up in the 
institutional structures of government, the processes of seeking access and 
influence, the contested elections that choose agendas and the persons who will 
implement them.  Speech cannot be abstracted from democracy and the 
business of forming a more perfect union is not simply a debating society.  One 
of the many things that our history has taught us is that some rules are required 
if freedom is to be not only protected but also enlarged.  Campaign finance is 
part of this larger effort.  The proponents of the political speech framework are 
going to have to address the issues raised in the political integrity framework 
with a seriousness that their approaches have heretofore lacked.  Doctrine does 
not exist as an end in itself.  Even the marketplace of ideas cannot escape, and 
has never escaped, debates over the ground rules for its operation.  Campaign 
finance is no exception. 
The political integrity framework of McConnell is also foundational.  It is 
much more grounded in processes and institutional arrangements.  At the same 
time, it seems to take the political speech rights for granted and to assume that 
political speech rights are so unassailable that the Court and the country can 
move on to other concerns.  This is not necessarily the case. 
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The Court could make a useful contribution by facing three issues that both 
sides have been avoiding.255  The first is whether money is speech.  If money is 
speech, are all forms of money from all sources directed to any entity from any 
source to be treated the same?  Can foreign funds finance political speech?  
What kinds of political speech?  Issue advocacy?  Contributions to candidates? 
The second issue is whether corporations are persons for purposes of 
political speech under the First Amendment.  Are there any constitutionally 
relevant distinctions among types of corporations?  Are there any permissible 
limitations on the types of political speech consistent with the First 
Amendment rights of particular types of corporations?  These questions will 
take the Court far beyond the limits of the two frameworks and far beyond the 
limits of the current doctrines. 
The third issue is the operational meaning of association.  In its zeal to 
establish a constitutional predicate for the corporate political speech agenda, 
the majority in WRTL II focuses on the speech rights of associations but 
disregards the associational rights of members and contributors.  One of the 
truly deplorable elements of WRTL II is the majority’s refusal to recognize the 
right of individuals to associate.  The majority was content to treat this denial 
of people’s rights within associations as constitutionally acceptable collateral 
damage. 
How can “we the people” perform our continuing constitutional duty to 
form a more perfect union if we have no rights within our associations?  
Associations do not exist simply to amplify our voices; associations are not 
simply about speech.  They are also about power and access and influence.  
The McConnell political integrity framework stopped well short of recognizing 
these issues as well, but it at least provided a framework for taking them 
seriously. 
These problems become even more serious in light of the Court’s efforts to 
exclude Congress from a role in determining the policies applicable to 
campaign finance.  These efforts are counterproductive and inconsistent with 
the Constitution.  Campaign finance issues go to the foundations of democratic 
theory and are not the exclusive preserve of any one branch of government.  
Judicial review provides no basis for a judicial monopoly in this or any other 
area of the law.  Such claims by the Court are particularly ill-advised if one 
remembers that elections are the only means for the people to give operational 
meaning to their sovereign role under the Constitution.  Claims of judicial 
monopoly are inconsistent with the role accorded to sovereign people in the 
Constitution. 
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